The way the Bundeswehr as an organization collects, analyzes and disseminates lessons learned gives critical indications for how effectively the German Army learns as part of the Bundeswehr. This monograph analyzes the lessons learned process by means of normative factors that promote learning in organizations. The more each factor is prevalent in an organizational unit the more opportunity exists for learning. The results show that the lessons learned system is appropriate to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions that allow learning to emerge and flourish. However, the research also reveals barriers to learning that hamper effective organizational learning. Two cost-effective measures might mitigate the effects of these learning barriers. An independent lessons-learned center posted on a case by case basis during major operations would help to facilitate rapid collection and dissemination in theater and the utilization of Web 2.0 technologies would virtually flatten the organizational relationships and speed up the learning cycle.
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Introduction
On June 7, 2003, in Kabul, Afghanistan, a taxi packed with explosives drew up alongside a bus that was on its way to the International Airport carrying 33 homeward bound German soldiers. The suicide attack killed four and wounded 29 soldiers. This was the first time that German troops were deliberately attacked by a suicide bomber and with a single attack it caused the highest number of casualties since the German Armed Forces deployed troops to missions abroad. After the incident, media questioned why the German Army used commercial buses and unprotected vehicles in an operational environment that is perceived as more violent than the missions in Kosovo and Bosnia. Subsequently, the German Army was reinforced through the acquisition of a broad mix of protected vehicles for all sorts of missions. Today, the German Army utilizes these vehicles wherever possible and appropriate.
1 Six years later, in July 2009, after several patrols were ambushed in recent months, German soldiers in Afghanistan began to operate according to a new set of rules of engagement that allow them to use force preemptively.
There had been mounting criticism that the soldiers did not have the necessary authority to defend themselves militarily in threatening situations. Bundeswehr soldiers will now, for the first time, be able to use mortar grenades and armored personnel vehicles in the northern province of Kunduz.
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These examples represent one type of organizational learning. Namely, the incidents and implications imposed on the German Army the need to adapt to the operational environment.
They are at the same time prominent examples of how an organization should not learn. In the aftermath of the suicide attack, the question was raised who was accountable for the decision that led to the use of unprotected vehicles in a violent operational environment. The answer to that question would only provide a specific answer to deal with this specific example. However, these examples may also be a symptom for a more general underlying problem.
The Bundeswehr has not suffered from a shortage of reforms in the past. The Army alone has already undergone four structural reforms since German reunification and the integration of the two German armies. The Bundeswehr is today divided into a military part, the armed forces themselves, and a civil part with the armed forces administration, the federal bureau of procurement and the federal bureau for information management and information technology.
Considering that the size of the German Armed Forces is comparable to the size of the United States Marine Corps, it makes sense that the Bundeswehr is concentrating on a capabilities oriented concept as stressed by the Chief of Defense, General Wolfgang Schneiderhan. "The capabilities of our service branches no longer have priority; priority rests with the capabilities of the Bundeswehr as a whole." 3 The White Paper for German Security Policy states: "Depending on operational demands, there will be different levels of capability in the response, stabilization and support forces." 4 The Bundeswehr's new orientation has meant that since 2001 it has been engaged in the most fundamental change since German unification and the transformation of the Bundeswehr is still ongoing. Today, the German Armed Forces consist of not only the three traditional services Army, Navy and Air Force but also of an additional Joint Support Service and the Central Medical Services. These additional services provide support services, like logistics and intelligence, to Army, Navy and Air Force mainly through organizational elements that had been an integral part of the traditional services before the transformation. The efforts to pool services into the Joint Support Service and the Central Medical Services led to a higher demand for coordination between the services, especially during operations. The new structure led as well to a more distributed structure for the Army's lessons learned system. Consequently, the Bundeswehr, under auspices of the Ministry of Defense, pursues an integrated and joint approach to collecting, interpreting and disseminating lessons learned from operational experiences and exercises. 5 The incidents described earlier suggest that the Bundeswehr's lessons learned structure and the way it processes lessons learned hamper effective organizational learning.
However, the way the Bundeswehr as an organization collects, analyzes and disseminates lessons learned from its operational experiences is not only of utmost significance for force protection and effectiveness in missions, but also gives critical indications for how effectively the Bundeswehr learns as an organization.
The research here does not address the issue whether human behavior and leadership culture in the Bundeswehr contribute to its learning capability. That research does not lie within the scope of this study. However, there is no doubt that the nature of learning and the way it takes place are determined in large measure by the culture of an organization. 6 The research assessed the German lessons learned process on the basis of the two most relevant directives of the The two directives of the Ministry of Defense and a Standing Operating Procedure of the Bundeswehr Operations Command describe in detail the Bundeswehr's and German Army's lessons learned process. However, the German organization for capturing and disseminating lessons learned cannot be assessed until a standard has been defined. The standard is found in the current approaches to organizational learning. That literature identifies normative facilitating factors that promote learning. The more each facilitating factor is prevalent in an organizational unit the more opportunity exists for learning. 8 Armed with an understanding of organizational learning concepts it is possible to select the relevant elements that process lessons learned in the Bundeswehr in general and the Army in particular. The identified elements can be categorized in three groups; elements that acquire information, elements that interpret and disseminate information, and lastly elements that ensure application of lessons learned. These three categories and their interaction with each other can then be compared to facilitating factors drawn from organizational learning concepts. That comparison reveals that the Bundeswehr and the German Army are properly organized for learning but that the authority structure impedes the process.
It appears that the German way to acquire, interpret, disseminate and ensure the application of lessons learned fulfills by and large the requirements of the identified facilitating factors. Accordingly, the lessons learned system is appropriate to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions that allow learning to emerge and flourish. However, the research revealed also barriers to learning that constrain effective organizational learning. The authority to release new knowledge and make it available as a lesson learned lies solely with the executive staff of the German Army, the lengthy process and the complicated lessons learned architecture hampers rapid collection and dissemination.
Two measures might eliminate or at least mitigate the effects of these learning barriers.
An independent lessons learned center posted on a case by case basis during major operations would help to facilitate rapid collection and dissemination of lessons learned in theater and the utilization of Web 2.0 technologies would virtually flatten the lessons learned organizational relationships and speed up the learning cycle.
Best Practices to Enhance Organizational Learning
The German military has a long standing tradition of analyzing operational lessons that shows, the more learning facilitators are prevalent in an organization the more opportunity exists for learning. Having more opportunities enhances the learning capability.
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A description of conditions that promote learning can be found in a variety of publications. The factors presented here are based primarily on the works of Peter Senge, DiBella and Nevis, and David Garvin who are practitioners in the field of building learning capacities in organizations. These authors and others name facilitating factors as normative elements. The normative elements represent the conditions or practices that promote learning in organizations.
These factors are:
• An involved leadership -Leaders must engage in the implementation of lessons learned, including being visible in the organization as a model for the learning effort.
• A systems perspective -The organization cannot learn when it focuses on short-term results and ignores the long-term consequences of its actions.
• Scanning -is an organization's scouting function; it provides the stimulation and direction of knowledge generation.
• Creative tension or awareness of a performance gap -It is crucial that organizational members have a shared awareness that there is a difference between the organization's desired and actual performance.
• A concern for measurement -As part of feedback systems, measures help managers decide whether they are on course or if corrections are needed.
• An organizational curiosity -This factor fosters an environment in which people are encouraged to try out things on an ongoing basis.
• A climate of openness -This is related to the permeability of information boundaries and the degree to which opportunities to observe and to participate are available to everyone.
• Continuous education -is the internalization of a commitment to lifelong education at all levels of the organization.
• Operational Variety -If an organization manifests several ways of doing something or has flexible work rules, its members can see different means to an end.
• Multiple advocates -are essential in order for knowledge to be effectively utilized.
As normative elements, these facilitating factors represent the conditions or practices that promote organizational learning along the stages of learning or, in other words, the learning process. There is a common understanding in organizational learning research that the general learning process encompasses three stages: information acquisition, interpretation and dissemination, and application of knowledge. 22 In the first stage, data, observations, and facts must be gathered and put into context. 
Role of Leadership and a Systems Perspective
Strong leadership is often a key factor in driving knowledge acquisition. It sends to any level of the organization a clear message about what is important to learn. Good leaders grasp this intuitively and frequently know how to get people to attend to an issue. However, leaders often fail to understand how important it is for them to be involved in knowledge dissemination and utilization. Leaders then find that knowledge developed or created at great expense is not broadly used or does not serve as a springboard for application in new settings. "We are told over and over that knowledge dissemination and knowledge utilization are more problematic than knowledge acquisition." 25 Often the problem is that leaders are less involved at those later stages.
Peter Senge has written much about the importance of leadership in setting a vision that mobilizes enhanced performance. 26 However, the findings of DiBella and Nevis indicate that merely creating vision is not enough. For truly assimilated, actionable learning to occur, leaders need to be early adopters and students of the knowledge. They must engage in directly implementing the vision and must be visible models for learning in the organization. In short, it makes a huge difference at any level of an organization if those in leadership positions can demonstrate that
they have learned what they want others to learn. Thus, an involved leadership means learning for the leader as well as providing a stimulus for others to learn.
The factor named systems perspective refers to the ability of organizational leaders to think in terms of whole systems and the interdependence of parts. When leaders lack a systems perspective their actions often lead to unanticipated consequences. Time lags and delays between the parts of a system mean that long-term results usually differ from short-term ones. Leaders cannot learn when they focus on short-term results and ignore the long-term consequences of their actions. 27 Senge considers this discipline to be the one that integrates all the others in his five-factor model of the learning organization. 28 As with an involved leadership, lack of a strong systems perspective is a barrier to successful dissemination and utilization of knowledge. 29 Therefore, the facilitating factors leadership and systems perspective are bound together. They are essential for learning at every phase of the learning cycle from the acquisition of information to the application of new knowledge. The rest of the factors are relevant to all phases as well but facilitate a specific stage of learning more than others. These factors will be discussed at the respective stage of the Bundeswehr's lessons learned process.
The Bundeswehr Lessons learned Process in Light of Theory
The Bundeswehr Operations Command plays a crucial role in the lessons learned process because it is the hub for Germany's operations abroad. To engage in scanning does not imply that an organization will simply borrow from or adapt what others are doing. Scanning is a way of sensing developing problems or opportunities and acting on them early rather than waiting until a problem is full-blown or a window of opportunity has closed. Therefore, scanning is an organization's scouting function because it provides the stimulation and direction for knowledge generation. 39 Conceptually, the Bundeswehr pursues a two-fold approach to collect information although the two approaches complement each other.
The first one is a top-down approach with clearly defined subjects for study, the so- The bottom-up approach encompasses all standardized reports by the mission contingent but it is not limited to it. systems perspective from which the problem must be studied. The third wrong kind of measures may occur when a long period of positive performance causes people to become complacent and resistant to critical self-examination. It also leads to easy rationalizations or 'theories of exceptional happenings' when negative, possibly disconfirming, feedback is perceived.
Awareness of a performance gap -either through analysis of performance shortfalls or a new vision -opens the door to learning by providing the initial awareness that new knowledge needs to be generated or that something needs to be 'unlearned.' To produce action the perception of a performance gap must be shared within the organization. 45 The Bw Top List itemizes elements the Bundeswehr leadership commonly considers to be important performance gaps of the Bundeswehr. Additionally, daily communication and reports in a variety of forms ensures a constant flow of information.
The intentional setup of the two-fold approach and lessons learned scanning elements suggests that organizational curiosity exists as well. This factor refers to support for trying new things, curiosity about how things work, and the ability to "play around" with new methods, and procedures. Organizational curiosity fosters an environment in which people are encouraged to try out things on an ongoing basis. With the assumption that experience creates learning, it follows that engaging in more kinds of experiences will lead to more learning. The concept of continuous improvement derives from similar reasoning; it assumes that the way things are done today may not be the way they will be done tomorrow. 46 A willingness to embrace contradictory, unexpected findings cannot be developed and maintained if people are punished when they try something new and it fails or is less effective than the old way. Some organizations deal with this problem by creating parallel systems in which new ways are tried out while the old is kept in place to minimize disruption and as insurance. An example for such parallel systems is the method of Concept Development and Experimentation, which the Bundeswehr has also adopted.
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All organizations measure performance one way or another and in doing so accept the general measurement practices that are customary in their company or industry. As part of feedback systems, measures help leaders decide whether they are on course or if corrections are needed. In this sense, measurement is part of any adaptive learning system. However, studies have shown that some organizations view measurement as part of a learning process rather than as purely for monitoring and control. In these instances, leaders discuss the need for metrics that will give them new and different information. 48 Military leaders do not need to be convinced of the importance of measurement. They need to be motivated to see the value of approaching a
problem with an open mind concerning what needs to be measured and how their involvement in metric development provides a learning experience. The two above mentioned aspects of monitoring effects and controlling operations prove a deep concern for measurement. Overall, the Bundeswehr lessons learned process exhibits all facilitating factors that are relevant to the first stage of organizational learning: an involved leadership, a systems perspective, the scanning imperative, awareness of performance gaps, and a concern for measurement and organizational curiosity.
Interpretation and Dissemination
The second stage of the learning cycle is to interpret the information collected by putting it into context. This stage serves as a sense-making mechanism and enriches information with Knowledge is generated when we give meaning to information or experience. For the learning cycle to be engaged, agents of information acquisition must give meaning to information so that the creation of knowledge provides a basis for action. It is not sufficient to have the information in a lessons learned database. Organizational members must have a shared basis for interpreting that information and giving it meaning. Since the Bundeswehr is continually collecting operational experiences and, thus, creating or acquiring knowledge, the potential for learning is always there. To utilize that potential, the Bundeswehr has the capacity to disseminate and use that knowledge. Understanding the learning process at an organizational level means focusing not only on what information is being shared but where the information comes from and who is doing the sharing. The utilization of knowledge depends not only on its perceived relevance but also its social legitimacy. The point is that the contribution of knowledge to learning will depend on who is the source of the knowledge in the first place. 49 In the Bundeswehr's process, generally no written product that is related to assessments of failure and deficiencies or best practices leaves the contingent without being reviewed by the German contingent commander and by his national staff. Accordingly, the commander and his staff constitute the last interpretation authority in theater before information is being released to the Bundeswehr Operations Command for further analysis. 50 An important facilitating factor in this context is a climate of openness. This factor is related to the permeability of information boundaries and the degree to which opportunities to observe and to participate are available to organization members. The facilitating factor continuous education refers to the internalized commitment to lifelong education at all levels of the organization. To constantly develop organizational learning capability is to engage in an ongoing never-ending process. It is all but impossible to accept the notion of knowledge as a competitive weapon without realizing that learning does not end. Peter
Senge's discipline of 'personal mastery' is another way of looking at this factor. 61 An indicator of this factor is the extent to which these values permeate the entire organization, not just the training and development function. 
Application of Lessons learned
Knowledge may be generated and disseminated throughout an organization, but the learning cycle remains incomplete unless new knowledge is used to alter decisions or behavior.
Although involved leadership is a prerequisite for enhancing the acquisition, dissemination, and utilization of knowledge, effective use of knowledge requires multiple advocates. Unless a significant number of people act as role models and promote new knowledge, the knowledge base will not be broadly used. When acting alone, change or learning advocates can too easily be dismissed as deviants or malcontents. The greater the number of advocates who promote a new idea and the greater the number of 'gatekeepers' who bring knowledge into the system, the more rapidly and extensively will true organizational learning take place. To make any skill or piece of knowledge useful to members of the organization generally, a number of respected key members of the organization must be seen as using it and trying to influence others regarding its value.
Advocates serve several purposes. In addition to being 'preachers', they serve as role models for others to observe. This supports generalization of the learning to new situations. Also, the more people who promote a leaning mode, the more learning in general is encouraged. The German Army's preferred leadership concept is that of 'Führen mit Auftrag' or in Anglo-American military circles better known as Auftragstaktik. Similar to U.S. Army's Mission
Command but still less prescriptive, Auftragstaktik itself facilitates achieving operational variety, another facilitating factor. Operational variety complements the factor organizational curiosity in that it implies that there is more than one way to accomplish work goals. It assumes that an organization that supports variation in strategy, policy, process, structure, and personnel is more adaptable when unforeseen problems arise. It provides more options and, perhaps even more As in the latter phase, leadership is involved at all levels in the process of applying lessons learned. The Army pursues short-term, mid-term and long-term measures in its effort to learn from experiences. Immediate measures may alter the way of providing logistics, alter the organization in general, or spur short-term acquisition of materiel, so called Einsatzsofortbedarf.
At the same time, the Bundeswehr as a whole considers mid-and long-term solutions as well; this may result in changes to materiel procurement, doctrine, and more generally the future transformation of the Bundeswehr. 73 This leads to the conclusion that the facilitating factors systems perspective and involved leadership are eventually inherent in all stages of the Bundeswehr's learning process. It appears that the German way to acquire, interpret, disseminate, and apply lessons learned fulfills by and large the requirements for organizational learning.
Accordingly, the lessons learned system provides the necessary and sufficient conditions that allow learning to emerge and flourish. Nevertheless, there are some barriers to learning. 
Towards an Agile and Adaptive Army
The new structure of the Bundeswehr and the capabilities-oriented approach led to the complex lessons learned architecture depicted in Figure 3 . The graphic, representing a synopsis of the lessons learned process, makes clear that the price for pooling services in specialized organizations resulted in a high demand for coordination and reconciliation under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense.
As shown in Figure 3 , the Bundeswehr depends more than ever on a frictionless flow of information within and between the services to function effectively. However, the research suggests that the critical facilitating factor climate of openness, which would be of utmost importance under these conditions, is not as strong as other factors. Especially, built-in information barriers found in the Army directive potentially hamper effective organizational learning. The directive states that the authority to release new knowledge and making it available as lesson learned lies solely with the executive staff of the German Army. Furthermore, the 74 However, a more cost-effective approach seems to be more feasible.
1. An independent lessons learned center in theater, posted on a case by case basis, could facilitate rapid collection and dissemination of lessons learned and avoids involvement of the Bundeswehr Operations Command. The chain of command over the Bundeswehr Operations
Command would be involved, too. However, the primary focus in theater would lie on lessons learned and best practices to conduct operations more effectively.
2. The utilization of Web 2.0 technologies could virtually flatten the lessons learned architecture and speed up the learning cycle.
Flat Lessons learned Architecture
Generally, all military units of the Bundeswehr at home and in theater have access to the information system EEBw. However, the release of knowledge and its classification as 'lesson- 79 The lesson identified will be developed on intranet pages that are marked as ongoing discussion. Authenticated users could contribute to lessons identified where these users deem changes are necessary no matter where they are assigned to in the Bundeswehr organization.
These discussions on changes and suggestions should be accessible to everyone. To ensure the quality of lessons learned and best practices, only information that is being released by a moderator at the executive staff of the German Army at the Ministry of Defense, will be published to the official front page. However, what is key, is that as many as possible contributors have access to the information behind the officially released front page that provides background information and enables a collaborative search for solutions. Allowing all users to contribute to an identified lesson stored on the wiki would dramatically broaden the body of acquired knowledge on operational experiences. This effort would also virtually flatten the lessons learned architecture and speed up the learning cycle because basically every organization member could be invited to contribute to generate new knowledge regardless where he or she is working in the organization.
Rapid Collection and Dissemination in Theater
The second suggestion is to implement an independent lessons learned center in theater, Hezbollah. 83 The Israeli Defense Force formed a Center for Army Lessons learned, which "collected, analyzed and dispersed operational knowledge and lessons learned in real-time amongst fighting forces." 84 The center gathered knowledge gained from each day's operations, printed digests, and distributed these down to company level by the next day.
To achieve the Israeli level of collecting and disseminating of lessons learned requires experienced full-time observer officers working in theater. Building a temporary center for lessons learned (TCLL) or creating a detachment from the J3 cell could significantly speed up the learning in theater during major operations or other significant events. The TCLL must have the authority to interpret and disseminate deficiencies, identified lessons and best practices theaterwide. The temporary center for lessons learned (TCLL) could rapidly generate lessons learned while connected with dispersed troops and the home base via the suggested milWiki. Lessons learned and best practices could be distributed daily online via the milWiki and in person through briefings by observer officers. German troops are at the moment regularly deployed in four month terms, key personnel six months or longer. Therefore, another advantage would be that a TCLL could be deployed on a different cycle and serve as memory of the contingent.
Conclusion
The transformation of the Bundeswehr pooled services into the Joint Support Service and the Central Medical Services and led to a capabilities-oriented concept that demands significantly more coordination between the services. The new structure produced a more distributed structure for the Bundeswehr's lessons learned system as well. Consequently, the Bundeswehr pursues an integrated and joint approach for collecting, interpreting and disseminating lessons learned from operational experiences under auspices of the Ministry of Defense. Field reports and the vanHeyst-report concluded that the Bundeswehr does not learn effectively from its operational experiences and that there are factors that are barriers to learning.
Organizational learning concepts and many publications on knowledge management and learning organizations discuss normative factors that facilitate learning in an organization such as an involved leadership, a systems perspective, an awareness of a performance gap, a concern for measurement, organizational curiosity, a climate of openness, and multiple advocates. All facilitating factors are found in the Bundeswehr's formal lessons learned process. One can conclude the lessons learned system provides the necessary and sufficient conditions that allow learning to emerge and flourish. However, the research shows that the actual dissemination of lessons learned does not occur until the Ministry of Defense approves it. Until then, only departments that are concerned with evaluating and departments concerned with processing and monitoring have full access to the information. While reports with shortcomings are written in an open und frank style, there are at the same time strong information barriers and only few participate in the learning process. In contrast, given the new structure the Bundeswehr actually depends more than ever on a frictionless flow of information within and between the services to function effectively.
One way to tackle the barriers to learning is to promote a more collaborative climate of openness by implementing an organization wide network for interpreting and disseminating of identified lessons. While in past missions learning was done mainly before and after the mission contingent's term, a temporary center for lessons learned could rapidly generate lessons learned while connected with dispersed troops and the home base via a milWiki. Thus, the Army could speed up its learning cycle dramatically. Flattening the information relationships would allow many more soldiers to contribute and collaborate accessing in the process. The effects of personnel turn over would be mitigated if not solved and the burden on the deployed contingent to document relevant lessons learned would be eased.
